Antichthon

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The Harmony of Fixed Fate and Free Will in the *Iliad*

i. Pouring new wine into old skins

Eberhard argues convincingly in his 1923 volume, *Das Schicksal als poetische Idee bei Homer* that fate is a narrative device in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* which guides the narration towards resolution.[1] As an example of fate at work, he cites the narrator harnessing fate to fulfil 'what must happen' when Zeus finds the deaths of Sarpedon and Hector difficult.[2] Movement towards resolution, however, is not the only force motivating the narration. Achilles' vacillations between remaining or quitting pull the narration away from resolution: such episodes suggest the idea of an apparent freedom within fate. If Iliadic fate or free will were unwavering dogmatic notions, their coexistence would be problematic. But perhaps harmony between the two is possible when free will in the *Iliad* is—like Eberhard's conception of fate—a poetic or narrative device.

The concepts of fate and free will are at no apparent odds when freedom is only alluded to and fate is accomplished through divine intervention. Such a fate and free will are poetic concepts which may be seamlessly integrated: fate is accomplished by gods rather than by some cosmic impulse *beyond* causality and freedom is at last only hinted at. Furthermore, the narrator may use poetic fate to generate suspense, a technique which further detracts attention from the implausibility of freedom within fate. Briefly, this is accomplished as follows: the narrator begins by using prolepses to foreshadow eventualities. These prolepses are often combined with the idea of fate (e.g. 12.110-7). Therefore, when the audience attempts to figure out when a prolepsis will be fulfiled, it is essentially trying to figure out fate's apportioned length of time. Because the audience does not know exactly when foreshadowed fate happens, the attempt to figure out fate's allotment of time involves the audience in the narrative by evoking suspense. Thus, by inviting the audience to treat fate as an allotment of time and by involving the audience in an atmosphere of suspense made possible by fate, the narrator encourages the audience to be more generous towards the notion of freedom within fate: when an audience is involved in the action, it is less likely to question implausibilities.[3] The relegation of fate and free agency into poetic concepts and the use of fate to add suspense work to ensure harmony between the two concepts. Or so I shall argue.

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[1]   E. Eberhard, *Das Schicksal als poetische Idee bei Homer* (Meisenheim 1923) 39 f.; B.C. Dietrich, *Death, Fate and the Gods*, (London 1965) 86, 182-3, weighs the advantages and disadvantages of Eberhard's arguments.

[2]   I refer to the author(s) of the *Iliad* throughout as 'the narrator' without intending to take a position on its authorship.

[3]   R. Scodel, *Credible Impossibilities* (Stuttgart 1999) 16, discusses narrative techniques which serve to make action credible.

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ii. Why fixed fate is required in the Iliad

There is consensus that the *Iliad* derives from a traditional story or mytho-
logical inheritance.[4] Fate is useful because it is a springboard for traditional
elements to enter the narrative. A very simplistic example is: if mythology
demands that the Trojans win glory during Achilles' absence, then they win
glory when he quits the field precisely because it is fated. Conversely, fate
conveniently justifies such occasions as the divine rescue of Aeneas—here
mythology demands that he outlast Troy.[5]

Hector's consolation to Andromache is an example of how fate is analo-
gous to the traditional story: μοῖραν δ᾿ οὔ τινά φημι πεφυγμένον ἔμμεναι
ἀνδρῶν,, οὐ κακόν, οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλόν, ἐπὴν τὰ πρῶτα γένηται (6.488 f.). On
one level, Hector is saying that nobody can escape fate. On another level, the
narratee who is familiar with the plot could understand that the traditional
story *is* the all-binding fate that Hector mentions.

Zeus faces a difficulty when he ponders whether to save Sarpedon and
Hector: he does not want to be accountable for the deaths of his favourites.
Hera and Athene make his decision easier when they raise this argument
against prolonging the lives of either hero: ἄνδρα θνητὸν ἐόντα, πάλαι
πεπρωμένον αἴσῃ ... (16.441, 22.179). They are reminding Zeus that because
fate demands their deaths, fate will take responsibility for their deaths. Their
argument has the effect of allaying his guilt, and he assents to what must
happen. As if to further absolve and distance himself from the death of
Hector, Zeus pulls out the impartial scales. Although Zeus knows the
outcome, the scales detract blame from him. Thus, the scales are a figurative
device by which responsibility is apparently transferred from Zeus onto fate.
In this way, fate remedies the dilemma and the action progresses. When Zeus
assents to Thetis, he knows that Sarpedon and Hector are condemned. But
this is a point better suppressed.

iii. Why free will is required in the Iliad

Hansen believes that while moderns draw a distinction between history and
myth, the ancients up to the time of Demosthenes generally did not.[6] Gabba
reaches a similar conclusion: 'the poetry of Homer was always *regarded* as a
historical text (emphasis added).'[7] If the mythological inheritance was
regarded as history proper, it would not be surprising if the Iliadic narrator
working in the eighth century believes that the traditional story is a historical
story. Because the narrator is presenting a story with a historical background,
characters' deeds and words are attributed to choice when possible to bolster

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4   On the *Iliad* drawing from a traditional story, see, inter alia, S. Richardson, *The
        Homeric Narrator* (Nashville 1990) 194-5.

5   Scodel (n.3) 13 discusses apologetic uses of fate.

6   M.H. Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure,
        Principles and Ideology* (Oxford 1991) 299. G. S. Shrimpton, *History and Memory in
        Ancient Greece* (Montreal 1997) 91-134, esp. 91, 98, 104, 118, discusses the 'use of
        myth to narrate a historical experience', and suggests that the production of ancient
        historical and mythological narratives share a common thread in that they may draw
        from a communal memory of events.

7   E. Gabba, 'True History and False History in Classical Antiquity', *JRS* 71 (1981) 52-3.
        See also H. Fränkel, *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy* (New York 1972) 57. For a
        discussion of how the 'historicity' of the events impacts the narrative presentation and
        reception, see Scodel (n.3) 24-6, 30, 34-5, 61.

narrative credibility. A history comprising characters who are fatalistic puppets is not convincing.[8]

The invocation to the Muses is part of an attempt to justify the historicity or credibility of the epic.[9] Just as the 6 o'clock news documents the real world by images, the Muses are called to present photographic recollections of actual events for the ancient newshour. The catalogue of ships is an example. They are invoked twice during the enumeration of Greek forces to ensure objective accuracy (2.484, 2.761).

De Jong argues that '*if* not-situations' are utilized as a narrative device confirming the absolute reliability of the *Iliad* as a presentation of history or 'what really happened'.[10] An Argive homecoming before Troy's fall is one such counterfactual *if* not-situation (2.155f). In this instance, if an outside force does not act, the Argives will return home prematurely. So, the narrator calls upon an outside force (Hera) to save the plot because he knows the historical sequence. The narrator uses *if* not-situations as a bulwark against those who doubt the accuracy of his presentation and to reassure the audience that the presentation records the true progression of events.

Shay believes that Achilles' emotional development closely mirrors the experiences of Vietnam veterans suffering from Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).[11] PTSD afflicts soldiers exposed to battlefield horrors and its symptoms include violent swings between rage, grief and pity. Achilles is a likely candidate for this illness: after all, he has been witnessing and committing inhumanities in the foremost ranks for ten years. Therefore, an audience having first hand knowledge of war (a frequent and personal affair in Archaic and Classical Greece) and its tolls would likely appreciate the authenticity of how the narrator presents Achilles' psychic deterioration and rehabilitation throughout the telling of the traditional story. Thus, Achilles' emotional development may add further credibility to the story.

During moments of introspection, the text quietly reflects upon its origin. One instance occurs when the narrator uses Helen as a mouthpiece (Helen to Hector):

> ἀλλ' ἄγε νῦν εἴσελθε καὶ ἕζεο τῷδ' ἐπὶ δίφρῳ,
> δᾶερ, ἐπεί σε μάλιστα πόνος φρένας ἀμφιβέβηκεν
> εἵνεκ' ἐμεῖο κυνὸς καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἕνεκ' ἄτης,
> οἷσιν ἐπὶ Ζεὺς θῆκε κακὸν μόρον, ὡς καὶ ὀπίσσω
> ἀνθρώποισι πελώμεθ' ἀοίδιμοι ἐσσομένοισι. (6.354-8)

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8   P.V. Jones, 'The Independent Heroes of the *Iliad*', *JHS* 116 (1996) 117-8, remarks: 'Achilles must be seen to be acting as a free agent, otherwise the epic and Achilles' story would become mere melodrama: mere Cyclic epic. As it is, it becomes tragic.' See note fourteen for evidence that the narrator believes in free agency. On how characters must maintain a semblance of 'reality' or historicity before the audience, see G.S. Kirk, 'History and Fiction in the *Iliad*', in Vol. 2 of *The* Iliad: *A Commentary* (Cambridge 1990) 37.

9   W. Thalmann, *Conventions of Form and Thought in Early Greek Epic Poetry*, (Baltimore, 1984) 128-9, 146-7, discusses the role of the Muses' invocation in epic. Also see M. Edwards, *Homer: Poet of the* Iliad (Baltimore 1987) 19.

10   On *if* not-situations confirming the reliability of the narrator, see I.J.F. de Jong, *Narrators and Focalizers: The Presentation of the Story in the* Iliad (Amsterdam 1987) 81.

11   For a study of how Achilles' actions may result from combat trauma, see J. Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character* (New York 1994).

> But come now and rest on this chair, brother. For it is because of the
> dog that I am and the infatuation of Alexander that toil constricts
> your life most forcefully. Zeus fixed evil fate upon us so that even
> afterwards we may become an object of song for generations yet to
> be.

On the surface, Hector perceives that Helen is ending her denouncement of
self and Paris with a tone of resignation. But beneath the surface, the dialogue
is directed to the narratee who finds the grimness of their evil fate and the
general grandiloquence of events too incredible to have originated from 'real'
life. The passage reminds the narratee that although it is unlikely any worldly
history could contain such concatenations of events, all things are possible
when worldly history mingles with divine history. Zeus demands the mor-
bidity of fate and Zeus demands the suprahistorical crescendo of great words
and greater deeds. Disbelief can be swallowed with the assurance that the
events are historical because of the divine presence.[12]

An attempt to assert the historicity of the text can be seen when the
narrator alludes to events outside the text by inserting prolepses which antici-
pate the future. For example, the prolepsis which foresees Zeus, Poseidon and
Apollo wrecking the Greek wall and restoring the landscape accounts for the
fact that no remnants of the wall are visible (12.13ff.). Thus, the narrator
settles any questions on the post-Iliadic landscape by inserting the prolepsis
foreseeing gods working in concert to destroy the Greek wall after the best of
the Trojans fall.[13]

Because free will seems to be intuitively real, narrative credibility
increases when words and deeds seem to arise from choices and decision
making processes. For this reason, the narrator requires free will.[14] Not every
action, however, needs to arise from choice. Sometimes it is inconvenient to
attribute decisions to free agency. For instance, many die through Agamem-
non's ineptitude when he seizes Briseïs from Achilles. This act of sheer
stupidity is not flattering to Agamemnon. Since the narrator *seems* interested
in portraying Greeks complimentarily (witness the body count: 190 Trojans to
52 Greeks), he has Agamemnon uphold that he was 'infatuated by god' (ἀτῆ,
19.88).[15] In other words, he had no choice. Flexibility, not dogmatic fortitude,
breathes life into art—a point not lost on the Iliadic narrator.

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[12]   Cf. Thalmann (n.9) 153: 'Helen's statement to Hektor, then, jolts the audience out of
       absorption in the story, reminds its members that they are hearing about men and
       women of long ago through a performance of poetry.'

[13]   de Jong (n.10) 88.

[14]   But does the narrator believe in free will? For affirmative arguments, see H. Lloyd-
       Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (Berkeley 1971) 10; J.V. Morrison, 'Kerostasia, the Dictates
       of Fate, and the Will of Zeus in the *Iliad*', *Arethusa* 30, no. 2 (1997) 274 ff.; S. L.
       Schein, *The Mortal Hero* (Berkeley 1984) 58; R. Sharples, '"But Why Has my Spirit
       Spoken with me Thus?"': Homeric Decision Making', *G&R* 30, no. 1 (1983) 1-7, and
       especially R. Gaskin, 'Do Homeric Heroes Make Real Decisions?', *CQ* 40 (1990) 1-20.
       E.R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, (Berkeley 1951) 7 warns that Homeric free
       will and fatalism are anachronistic, a view refuted by Gaskin (n.14) 3ff.

[15]   On the bodycount, see M. Lang, 'Unreal Conditions in Homeric Narrative', *GRBS* 30
       (1989) 9.

iv. Reconciling fixed fate and free will

Fate and free will are by definition antithetical. If fate is fixed, there cannot be free will. And free agency likewise leaves little room for fate. The narrator, however, requires both concepts. He needs fate because it is a rigid and centripetal will towards the straight line and goal of narrative resolution. He needs free will because it is a flexible and centrifugal force asserting the humanity of the characters, their worthiness of praise or blame. How does the narrator insert fate and free will into the *Iliad* without the smack of artificiality?

Iliadic fate and free will are at bottom a poet's fate and free will.[16] With this in mind, they may be reconciled. The narrator requires a poetic union of fate and free will to tell a story worthy to be sung. A narrative landscape dominated by fate would allow for the unfolding of myth, but the song of Achilles' μῆνις would not be sung for long if characters' lives are all drained by a vampiric fatalism. A narrative landscape dominated by free agency could be more interesting, but here no myth could find footing. Myth has a tendency to aim towards the least common denominator of many situations to arrive at the most absurd outcome; it would be difficult to attribute the fabulous accumulations of coincidence found in many myths to free agency alone. A narrative landscape, however, where poetic free will *modulates* poetic fate brings about a hero who is free, but only free to succumb to fate.[17] This is the Iliadic hero.

Two principles regulate the harmonization of these poetic concepts into the text:

  1) Poetic fate is weak. It is real enough to propel the plot, yet is presented in a way which does not overpower the characters' lifelike qualities by an enervating fatalism.

  2) Poetic free will is weak. It is real enough to give the characters lifelike qualities, yet does not interfere with the narrative progression.

v. How the weak or poetic conception of fixed fate is presented

On first examination, fate does not appear weak at all. It is often qualified by κραταιή, which gives it a 'powerful' or 'irresistible' flavour.[18] The knowledge of Calchas, ὃς ᾔδη τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα (1.70) and the *volvens fatorum arcana* of Zeus in book fifteen reinforce the notion that fate is an irresistible cosmic force. Calchas would not be able to know past, present and future and Zeus would not be able to expound the course of fate to his colleagues if it were revocable. Finally, the fact that fate never errs in the *Iliad* attests to its powerful stature.

The narrator—although fate is powerful and never lapses—is able to present its irresistible nature without taking away from free agency. Because the later concepts of εἱμαρμένη and ἀνάγκη are unknown during the eighth

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16   'Homer exploits the poetic advantages of both perspectives [free will / fate] without bringing them into direct confrontation . . .' observes R. Janko, 'The Gods in Homer: Further Considerations', in Vol. 4 of *The* Iliad: *A Commentary*, (Cambridge, 1992) 5.

17   B. Knox, in the introduction (40) to Fagles' translation remarks that Greek thought can embrace the contradiction of fate and free will to avoid the meaninglessness of either rigid determinism (characterized by hopelessness through a lack of individual responsibility) or unbridled choice (characterized by anarchy).

18   Examples of μοῖρα κραταιή in the *Iliad*: 5.83, 5.629, 16.334, 16.853, 19.410, 20.477, 21.110, 24.209, 24.132.

century, fate in the *Iliad* has no teeth.[19] An active agent—normally the *deus ex machina*—must accompany weak fate's fulfilment.[20] Zeus plays the role of active agent when Teucer sets Hector within his crosshairs (15.463f.). If fate were a regulating cosmic impulse in and of itself, Teucer would not load his bow against Hector and divine intervention would be unnecessary. But since fate is weak, Zeus wrecks the bowstring to ensure that Hector carries on to meet his appointment at the decreed moment.

Characters are not denied free agency when the burden of fate falls upon an active agent because other outcomes made through choice are hypothetically possible.[21] Of course, wayward actions stemming from free agency never transpire because divine power corrects anything out of line. Thus, it is so: while for all intents and purposes poetic fate is irresistible, the problem of stripping free agency from the hero is carefully sidestepped by placing the onus of fate on an active agent more powerful than the hero.

Patroclus' final words illustrate how weak fate is associated with a real agent, the *deus ex machina* (16.843ff.). Patroclus names his slayers from first to last: μοῖρα, Apollo, Euphorbus and Hector. As Patroclus continues, he mentions that Hector is his third killer—not his fourth, as might be expected.[22] Everything adds up, however, if μοῖρα representing a weak fate and Apollo representing the real *deus ex machina* constitute one indivisible unit: μοῖρα as the concept of fate and Apollo as its active agent.

A real *deus ex machina* enforces a weak fate when Poseidon rushes in to save Aeneas. Poseidon happens to be both 'looking sharply' (ὀξὺ νόησε) and willing to act (Hera and Athene are not willing to save Aeneas, 20.291 ff.). If he were not ready and willing, Achilles would murder Aeneas then and there. So much for fate. In this example—as in the others—an active agent has been responsible for transforming fate into reality.[23] Weak fate is

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19   Dietrich (n.1) 337. Cf. A.W.H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values*, (Oxford 1960) 21; M. Clarke, *Flesh and Spirit in the Songs of Homer: A Study of Words and Myths*, (Oxford 1999) 9-13; Dodds (n.14) 7, 12.

20   On the *deus ex machina* as a causal agent in the ancient world, see H. Bergson, *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness* (London 1950) 214:

> Now it is obvious that the relation of causality, understood in this second way, does not involve the necessary determination of the effect by the cause. History indeed proves it. We see that ancient hylozoism, the first outcome of this conception of causality, explained the regular succession of causes and effects by a real *deus ex machina*: sometimes it was a Necessity external to things and hovering over them, sometimes an inner Reason acting by rules somewhat similar to those which govern our own conduct.

If Bergson is correct, it is not surprising the ancient Iliadic narrator ascribes fate (what must happen) to a 'real' causal agent, normally the *deus ex machina*.

21   For a treatment of how fatalism limits free agency, see D.P. Hunt, 'What *Is* the Problem of Theological Fatalism?', *International Philosophical Quarterly* 38 (1998) 17-30.

22   Adkins (n.19) 15.

23   On active agents being paired with fate see: 2.352,'Αργεῖοι Τρώεσσι φόνον καὶ κῆρα φέροντες; 4.396, Τυδεὺς μὲν καὶ τοῖσιν ἀεικέα πότμον ἐφῆκε; 5.652-3 (cf. 11.443-4), σοὶ δ' ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε φημὶ φόνον καὶ κῆρα μέλαιναν / ἐξ ἐμέθεν τεύξεσθαι; 8.166, πάρος τοι δαίμονα δώσω; 12.116-7, πρόσθεν γάρ μιν μοῖρα δυσώνυμος ἀμφεκάλυψεν / ἔγχεϊ Ἰδομενῆος; 16.103-4, δάμνα μιν Ζηνός τε νόος καὶ Τρῶες ἀγαυοί. βάλλοντες; 19.409-10, οὐδέ τοι ἡμεῖς / αἴτιοι, ἀλλὰ θεός τε μέγας καὶ Μοῖρα κραταιή; 19.417, μόρσιμόν ἐστι θεῷ τε καὶ ἀνέρι ἶφι δαμῆναι; 22.60-1, ὅν ῥα πατὴρ Κρονίδης ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ / αἴσῃ ἐν ἀργαλέῃ φθίσει. Also see E. Ehnmark, 'The Gods and Fate', in Vol. 2 of

therefore real enough to propel the plot, yet is presented in a way which does not drain vividness from the characters.

vi.   How the weak or poetic conception of free will is presented
In a poetic world where fixed fate and free will are both required, free will must also be weak. It must be real enough to endow the characters with a sense that they are continually evaluating and reacting with the world. It cannot, however, interfere with the fixed story. A logical place to look for glimpses of a hero exercising free will lies, therefore, in conditional clauses which signpost unreal conditions. Weak free will may be found in these clauses because unreal conditions do not disrupt the narrative. Conditional clauses can, however, intimate a hypothetical reality. The narrator could then use this hypothetical reality to demonstrate that free will exists within the text since possibility does not endanger the story's sequence.

Unreal conditions fall into two categories, one with affirmative protases, and the other with negative protases. Lang documents conditional clauses in her article, 'Unreal Conditions in Homeric Narrative', and cites two everyday examples. The first is an example of affirmative protasis, and the second negative protasis:

1) If the sun had shone, we would have had a picnic yesterday.
2) We would have had a picnic yesterday, if it had not rained.[24]

In both cases, the picnic was a very real possibility. The degree of reality accorded the picnic is determined by the protases: the first example (affirmative protasis) indicates an unrealized possibility; the second example (negative protasis) suggests that the picnic was a certainty prevented by the rain. Although unreal conditions are hypothetical, they afford degrees of reality.[25]

There are in total forty-four examples of unreal conditions in the *Iliad*.[26] Unreal conditions introduced by prepositional phrases such as: ὑπὲρ αἶσαν, ὑπὲρ μόρον, ὑπὲρ θεόν, etc., introduce events that would contradict fate were they to happen.[27] The following scenes demonstrate how unreal conditions in the narrative presenting actions 'beyond fate' intimate consciousness and choice.

Achilles is quite aware that it is not his fate to sack Troy. But rage overcomes knowledge and he attempts anyhow. Zeus sees this unfolding, and remarks to the council of gods:

εἰ γὰρ' Ἀχιλλεὺς οἶος ἐπὶ Τρώεσσι μαχεῖται,

δείδω μὴ καὶ τεῖχος ὑπὲρ μόρον ἐξαλαπάξῃ. (20.26-30)

Homer: Critical Assessments (London 1999) 360 and O. Tsagarakis, *Nature and Background of Major Concepts of Divine Power in Homer* (Amsterdam 1977) 126.

24   Lang (n.15) 6.
25   Lang (n.15) 6.
26   Lang (n.15) 7, 14.
27   F. Nietzsche, *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, (1882) 1.11 makes an intriguing remark on *Od.* 1.32ff. which is relevant to the present discussion:

Das Bewußtsein.—Die Bewußtheit ist die letzte und späteste Entwicklung des Organischen und folglich auch das Unfertigste und Unkräftigste daran. Aus der Bewußtheit stammen unzählige Fehlgriffe, welche machen, daß ein Tier, ein Mensch zugrunde geht, früher als es nötig wäre—,über das Geschick' wie Homer sagt.

For if Achilles fights the Trojans without divine obstruction,
. . . .
I fear that he will sack the Trojan wall beyond fate.

What Zeus implies is an unreal condition with conditional protasis, which is closely related to affirmative protasis: 'If Achilles fights without interference from the gods (οἶος), he will sack the Trojan wall ὑπὲρ μόρον [but he will not fight without interference from the gods and so he will not sack the Trojan wall ὑπὲρ μόρον]'. Zeus validates the legitimacy of Achilles' efforts in word and deed: he *says* that he fears (δείδω) Achilles will overbear the Διὸς βουλή and he *sends* other gods to take the field to maintain the proper progression of narrative (which does not include Achilles sacking Troy). By doing so, Zeus intimates that Achilles' ability to sack the wall is a real possibility, even though this possibility lies outside fate. Although Zeus states his anxiety in an unreal condition, he confirms the notion that Achilles has recourse to act upon his wishes.

Weak free will can be seen in this unreal condition which is beyond fate. Achilles, replying to the embassy, states:

> εἰ δέ κεν οἴκαδ' ἵκωμι φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν,
> ὤλετό μοι κλέος ἐσθλόν, ἐπὶ δηρὸν δέ μοι αἰὼν
> ἔσσεται, οὐδέ κέ μ' ὦκα τέλος θανάτοιο κιχείη.
> καὶ δ' ἂν τοῖς ἄλλοισιν ἐγὼ παραμυθησαίμην
> οἴκαδ' ἀποπλείειν, ἐπεὶ οὐκέτι δήετε τέκμωρ
> Ἰλίου αἰπεινῆς· (9.414-19)

> But if I return home to my beloved fatherland, my excellent fame will be lost. Yet my life will endure long, and the end of death would not quickly overtake me. I would also urge you others to sail homewards, since you will no longer take steep Ilios.

In a nutshell, Achilles pronounces in this unreal condition with conditional protasis: 'If I return home, I will lose my glory and have a long life but you will not take Troy'. The suppressed fact 'my return home is ὑπὲρ μόρον' is implicit because there would be no story if he returns home. So, although it is his fate to stay, die and win great glory, by presenting this unreal condition, Achilles indicates that if he chooses to stay, this is because he *chooses* this fate. He is free to succumb to fate. Freedom to succumb to fate is a weak or poetic free will.

There is no reason to doubt Achilles' ability to return home, as the narrator often makes a special effort to portray Achilles' free agency. For example, the narrator has Athene actually ask Achilles whether he would *choose* to obey her and stay his anger at Agamemnon (1.207f.).[28] Also, Achilles is implicitly freer than Adrastus and Amphius, who journey to Troy against Merops' exhortations *without* having chosen—this is explicit: (narrator speaking) κῆρες γὰρ ἄγον μέλανος θανάτοιο (2.834). In the beginning, no κῆρες are leading Achilles to the house down below. Achilles wills himself there.[29] Since Adrastus and Amphius are cannon fodder, no problems arise if

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[28]   Morrison (n.14) 282, observes that characters can choose to disobey gods (1.12-33, 3.389-420, 21.214-27) or to obey (5.436-44, 16.707-11). T.E. Rihll, 'The Power of the Homeric βασιλεῖς', *Homer 1987* (Liverpool 1992) 40, 50, discusses Achilles' apparent freedom.

[29]   On Achilles' choices see Dietrich (n.1) 186-7: 'This concept of Moira as the personal fate of each individual means that for Homer there was no absolute fate regulating events on a general level, but each hero could determine his own destiny by his actions.

fatalism drains their lives of sense. Achilles, of course, is not fodder and must take some responsibility for his actions to preserve narrative credibility.

Other examples of unreal conditions contrary to fate or fate's timetable include:

1)   the Argives fleeing ὑπέρμορα (2.155f.)
2)   Achilles killing Aeneas ὑπὲρ μοῖραν (20.332f.)
3)   the Achaeans driving the Trojans up to Troy ὑπὲρ Διὸς αἶσαν (17.319f.)
4)   the Achaeans sacking the Trojan wall ὑπὲρ μόρον (21.514f.)

These unreal conditions indicate that the following events outside fate would have occurred: the Argives would have fled had not Hera intervened; Achilles would have killed Aeneas had not Poseidon acted; the Achaeans would have driven the Trojans up to Ilios had not Apollo urged Aeneas; the Achaeans would have sacked Troy had not Apollo roused Agenor. Weak free will inspires these unreal conditions: the Argives *will* to flee out of desperation; Achilles *wills* to kill Aeneas out of anger; the Achaeans *will* to drive the Trojans up to Ilios out of bravery; the Achaeans *will* to sack Troy out of battlelust.

Unreal conditions with negative or positive protases provide glimpses where the hero wills to act without or beyond fate. Free agency is therefore *attributed* to the hero by ὑπὲρ μόρον and synonymous phrases. Notice also how a secondary use of αἶσα seems to confirm that fate is no brick wall: Ἕκτορ, ἐπεί με κατ' αἶσαν ἐνείκεσας οὐδ' ὑπὲρ αἶσαν ... (3.59). Just as Hector may speak within or without αἶσα, Hector—or any other character— may act within or without αἶσα (fate).[30]

vii. What is a weak or poetic fixed fate?

What function do characters attribute to poetic fate? That is to say, what is the flavour of fate in such expressions: οὐ γάρ πώ τοι μοῖρα (7.52) . . . 'Your fate is not such-and-such' or νῦν αὐτέ με μοῖρα κιχάνει (22.303) 'Now fate has caught up with me'? The etymologies of various words translatable as 'fate' will help determine *what* weak fate is.

Eberhard writes: "Αἶσα kommt nach Brugmann von *aitia, oskisch aeteis partis, a/itium portionum und hat die Grundbedeutung 'portio Anteil'."[31] οἶτος—on more circumstantial evidence—may also derive "from the Oscan aetis-partis, αἶσα."[32] μοῖρα and μόρος derive from μείρομαι, 'to receive as one's portion'.[33] Alternatively, μοῖρα may be a cognate of μέρος, a *part* or *share*.[34] μόρσιμος and its poetic form μόριμος are related to μοῖρα, μόρος or αἶσα.[35] μοῖρα and αἶσα are also related and used interchangeably.[36]

Achilles had his own choice; and he chose a short life of glory, so that the more he acted like himself, the quicker he hurried to his fate.' Cf. C.M. Bowra, *Early Greek Elegists*, (New York 1960) 21; W. Schadewaldt, *Von Homers Welt und Werk*, (Stuttgart, 1944) 194; Schein (n.14) 90, 101.

30   Dietrich (n.1) 283.

31   Eberhard (n.1) 9. See also αἶσα in E. R. Wharton, *Etyma Graeca*, (1882).

32   Dietrich (n.1) 338.

33   Dietrich (n.1) 11.

34   See μοῖρα in Wharton (n.31) and *LSJ*.

35   Dietrich (n.1) 262-3. See also in H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, (Heidelberg 1960).

αἶσα is related to αἴσιμος.[37] On account of the *pet-* root, 'what is falling', πότμος may signify "the lot that falls to one."[38] Finally, Clarke believes "κήρ is probably from the same root as κείρω, 'I cut'—death is what is cut out or apportioned to mortal man."[39] These etymologies suggest that terms originally denoting *cut, portion, allotment* or *share* come to signify 'fate' or 'agent of fate'. Therefore, a sense of partitive division underlies terms denoting 'fate or 'agent of fate' (αἶσα, οἶτος, μοῖρα, μόρος, μέρος, μόρσιμος, μόριμος, πότμος and κήρ).[40] The following examples consider the use of these terms to signify partitive relationships.

Telamonian Aias says to Menelaus at 17.716: πάντα κατ' αἶσαν ἔειπες, ἀγακλεὲς ὦ Μενέλαε. The implication when a character is said to have spoken κατ' αἶσαν, κατὰ μοῖραν, ἐν μοίρῃ or αἴσιμα is: he has spoken knowing "an appointed place, an 'allotted share', according to which he *ought* to comport himself . . ."[41] So, Aias is saying that Menelaus has spoken knowing an allotted share or an appointed place. The importance of realizing one's appointed place or allotted share when speaking is paramount. Notice how Achilles voices with a degree of impunity what Thersites cannot (1.148ff. and 2.224ff.). Because Achilles recognizes his allotted share of honour and his appointed place in counsel when he censures Agamemnon, he is not rebuked. Because Thersites speaks out of his appointed rank (οὐ κατὰ κόσμον) when he chides Agamemnon, Odysseus clubs him.[42] Thus, when Aias indicates that Menelaus has spoken κατ' αἶσαν, the implication is that Menelaus has spoken well because he spoke within his allotment. In this example, therefore, αἶσα, μοῖρα, etc., in the phrases, κατ' αἶσαν, κατὰ μοῖραν, etc., indicate a portion, allotment or share (of social standing).[43]

Just before Patroclus enters the fray, Achilles reminds him: χώρης ὀλίγην ἔτι μοῖραν ἔχοντες, Ἀργεῖοι (16.68f.). He is saying that the Argives are currently holding a fraction or portion of enemy territory which they held in the past. Thus, μοῖρα indicates a portion, allotment or share (of territory). Another passage in which 'fate' signifies a portion is 10.251-3, part of the so-called night-raid (Odysseus speaking to Diomedes):

ἀλλ' ἴομεν· μάλα γὰρ νὺξ ἄνεται, ἐγγύθι δ' ἠώς,

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36   On interchangeability of μοῖρα with αἶσα see Dietrich (n.1) 249: 'The impersonal μοῖρα and αἶσα may occasionally make a pair of synonyms (cf. e.g. *Od.* v. 113 f.). Mr. Hainsworth kindly pointed out to me that in Homer there are other similar pairs which were chosen in such a way that one begins with a vowel and the other with a consonant--e.g. ἄλγος and κῆδος, εὐρέϊ πόντῳ and Ϝοίνοπι πόντῳ. Also see N. Yamagata, *Homeric Morality* (Leiden 1994) 116: The basic meaning of the word αἶσα, like μοῖρα, is a portion, share, or lot, and is virtually a synonym with μοῖρα, except that αἶσα seems to mean rather a portion 'measured' than 'divided'.

37   Dietrich (n.1) 251. See also αἴσιμος in *LSJ.*

38   Dietrich (n.1) 12.

39   Clarke (n.19) 231. See also G. Nagy, *The Best of the Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek Poetry* (Baltimore 1979) 135.

40   Dietrich (n.1) notes that only μοῖρα and αἶσα (of the words denoting fate) are used in the *Iliad* to signify a share of something other than life.

41   Adkins (n.19) 21. On characters being said to have spoken κατ' αἶσαν: 10.445, 17.716; οὐδ' ὑπὲρ αἶσαν: 3.59, 6.333; κατὰ μοῖραν: 1.286, 8.146, 9.59, 10.169, 15.206, 19.256, 23.626, 24.379; ἐν μοίρῃ: 19.186; αἴσιμα: 6.62, 7.121.

42   When Thersites speaks out of rank, it is fitting that the Zeus-descended sceptre (2.100ff.)—a symbol of social order (1.273f.)—corrects and silences him.

43   Cf. *Od.* 2.231 and 5.9, αἴσιμα εἰδώς.

ἄστρα δὲ δὴ προβέβηκε, παροίχωκεν δὲ πλέων νὺξ
τῶν δύο μοιράων, τριτάτη δ' ἔτι μοῖρα λέλειπται.

> But let us go, for night is certainly coming to an end. Dawn
> approaches, the stars have circled forward and more than two portions
> of night are spent. But yet a third is left.

Since a third is a fraction of the whole night, Odysseus uses μοῖρα to signify a
portion or share. Finally, the α–privative ἄμμορός describes a lack of a share.
Notice how the narrator uses the α–privative as he recounts Hephaestus fash-
ioning Orion on Achilles' shield: οἴη δ' ἄμμορός ἐστι λοετρῶν 'Ωκεανοῖο
(18.489). What is meant is that Orion has no share in the baths of Ocean.

Both etymology and use in context reinforce this partitive aspect of
fate. So, when characters mention: 'Your fate is not such-and-such' or 'Now
fate has caught up with me', they are saying: 'Your allotment of *x* is not such-
and-such' or 'Now my portion of *x* has run out'. *x* in these scenarios is likely
related to time.

viii. Why weak or poetic fate may be an allotment of time
Alfred Hitchcock makes the following observation concerning suspense:

> The audience is provided with information that the characters in the
> picture don't know about. Because of this knowledge, the tension is
> heightened as the audience tries to figure out what is going to happen
> next.[44]

The prolepses in the *Iliad* foreseeing the deaths of Asius, Lycaon, Patroclus
and Hector evoke an atmosphere of suspense. Since references to fate
frequently accompany prolepses, when the audience tries to figure out when a
prolepsis happens, they are in essence trying to unravel fate with regard to
time—how soon or when it will come. Because fate can represent an
allotment (social standing, territory, night), the narrator may use these prolep-
ses to invite the audience to consider fate as an allotment of time.[45] For exam-
ple, when Trojan Asius advances recklessly against the Greek wall in his car
despite Polydamas' contrary counsel, the narrator inserts a prolepsis foresee-
ing the death of Asius:

ἀλλ' οὐχ' Ὑρτακίδης ἔθελ'"Ασιος, ὄρχαμος ἀνδρῶν,
αὖθι λιπεῖν ἵππους τε καὶ ἡνίοχον θεράποντα,
ἀλλὰ σὺν αὐτοῖσιν πέλασεν νήεσσι θοῇσι,

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[44]   Hitchcock, qtd. in de Jong (n.10) 87.

[45]   Although it is difficult to pinpoint an exact identity or definition for the terms μοῖρα,
αἶσα, etc., it is agreed that these terms signal a share or portion. What this share or
portion represents is a fluid concept, and numerous views have been argued with equal
success. For example, Dietrich (n.1) 329-30, Janko (n.16) 5 and W.F. Otto, *Homeric
Gods* (New York 1954) 265 come to the conclusion that μοῖρα is connected with
death, the common fate of man. Clarke (n.19) 248 prefers to associate αἶσα with the
planning of death rather than death itself. Ehnmark (n.23) 359 and Tsagarakis (n.23)
134 argue that μοῖρα is the allotted portion or fulfilment of life. J. Kim, *The Pity of
Achilles* (Lanham 2000) 86 finds that in 9.318-20 Achilles can use μοῖρα to imply
both: share (of τιμή) and death. Yamagata (n.36) 119-20 believes that μοῖρα and
αἶσα signify a universal order. I suggest in this section without denying other
possibilities that because the concept of μοῖρα is fluid, the narrator may use it to
signify an allotment of time, a perspective in ways similar to those who see it as the
allotted portion of life.

νήπιος, οὐδ' ἄρ' ἔμελλε κακὰς ὑπο κῆρας ἀλύξας,
ἵπποισιν καὶ ὄχεσφιν ἀγαλλόμενος παρὰ νηῶν
ἂψ ἀπονοστήσειν προτὶ Ἴλιον ἠνεμόεσσαν.
πρόσθεν γάρ μιν μοῖρα δυσώνυμος ἀμφεκάλυψεν
ἔγχεϊ Ἰδομενῆος, ἀγαυοῦ Δευκαλίδαο. (12.110-7)

But Hyrtacus' son Asius refused to leave his horses or charioteer while
he led his squadron. Horses and all, he approached the swift ships.
Fool. It was not his destiny after exulting by the ships with horses and
car to escape the evils from the death spirits and return home to windy
Ilion. For long before, accursed fate covered him by the spear of
Idomeneus, son of Deucalion.

It is not until 13.387 that Idomeneus finishes Asius. From the initial prolepsis
explaining *how* Asius dies to his eventual doom, the suspense grows because
the narratee ponders *when* Asius will meet destiny. As the narratee ponders
when, an identification between fate and time can be made, for as soon as
suspense takes hold and the narratee tries to decipher the prolepsis, fate and
death—from the narratee's perspective—become analogous to an uncertain
allotment of time.

The prolepsis which foresees Lycaon's death at the hands of
Achilles indicates that Lycaon will run into Achilles and be run through by
Achilles' spear on the twelfth day after his return to Lemnos (21.45-8).
Lycaon runs into Achilles a few lines later, and vainly supplicates Achilles:

νῦν δὲ λύμην τρὶς τόσσα πορών· ἠὼς δέ μοί ἐστιν
ἥδε δυωδεκάτη, ὅτ' ἐς Ἴλιον εἰλήλουθα
πολλὰ παθών· νῦν αὖ με τεῇς ἐν χερσὶν ἔθηκε
μοῖρ' ὀλοή: (21.80-3)

And at this time I was released because I paid my price threefold.
After many hardships, I returned to Ilion. Today is the *twelfth day* of
my return. But *on this day*, hurtful fate has placed me into your hands
again (emphasis added).

Although the tension of suspense is not fully exploited (Achilles terminates
Lycaon rapidly after the prolepsis), what the prolepsis suggests is that the
narratee should associate fate with time: Lycaon's share of time (μοῖρα) is
twelve days.

The prolepses concerning the deaths of Patroclus and Hector encourage the narratee to think of *when* their fates will be fulfilled. When Achilles
sends Patroclus to verify that Machaon is injured, the narrator inserts a
prolepsis pointing towards Patroclus' demise (narrator speaking): κακοῦ δ'
ἄρα οἱ πέλεν ἀρχή (11.604). However, five books transpire until he dies
(16.855), and at 16.46 and 16.687 his death is foreshadowed again with
references to fate (κήρ). Thus, between books eleven and sixteen, the narratee
stands on edge anxiously wondering *when* Patroclus meets destiny. Likewise,
at 15.612-4, the narrator drops a prolepsis foreshadowing Hector's death:

μινυνθάδιος γὰρ ἔμελλεν
ἔσσεσθ'· ἤδη γάρ οἱ ἐπόρνυε μόρσιμον ἦμαρ
Παλλὰς Ἀθηναίη ὑπὸ Πηλεΐδαο βίηφιν.

For his life was destined to be brief, since Pallas Athene was already
rousing up his day of destiny under the might of Peleus' son.

Hector does not die until book twenty-two, and when the audience tries to decipher his fate, it does so with the units of time: how many days, hours or minutes before destiny overtakes him?

As Hitchcock remarks, additional information to the audience heightens the mood of suspense because the audience feels anticipation. Prolepses which presage death are a source of information and their application merges the concepts of time, fate and death. The result of this is that when an eventuality is fulfiled, the narratee—who has been associating fate with an uncertain allotment of time since the initial prolepsis—realizes: 'Yes, now character *y*'s allotment of time (fate) is fulfilled'. Thus, when a character says: 'Your fate is not such-and-such' or 'Now fate has caught up with me', the narratee understands: 'Character *y*'s allotment of time is not come [but his time is coming soon]' or 'Character *y*'s portion of time is come [because the *when* introduced by the prolepsis is solved]'. With this in mind, the best English equivalents are perhaps: 'Your time has not come' or 'Your time has come.'[46]

The union between fate and time is a rich motif in literature, especially tragedy. The final moments from Marlowe's *Dr. Faustus* is one such example. Faustus, realizing that fate as the remaining hour of time is running down, soliloquizes:

> Ah, Faustus,
>> Now hast thou but one bare hour to live
>> And then thou must be damned perpetually!
>> Stand still, you ever-moving spheres of heaven,
>> That time may cease and midnight never come;
>> Fair Nature's eye, rise, rise again, and make
>> Perpetual day; or let this hour be but
>> A year, a month, a week, a natural day,
>> That Faustus may repent and save his soul!
>> *O lente lente currite noctis equi.* (5.2.128-37)

Compare Faustus' soliloquy to Hera lamenting the death of her favourites (Hera to Athene):

> ὢ πόποι, αἰγιόχοιο Διὸς τέκος, οὐκέτι νῶι
> ὀλλυμένων Δαναῶν κεκαδησόμεθ' ὑστάτιόν περ;
> οἵ κεν δὴ κακὸν οἶτον ἀναπλήσαντες ὄλωνται
> ἀνδρὸς ἑνὸς ῥιπῇ, ὁ δὲ μαίνεται οὐκέτ' ἀνεκτῶς
> "Εκτωρ Πριαμίδης, καὶ δὴ κακὰ πολλὰ ἔοργε. (8.352-6)

> Well, daughter of aegis-bearing Zeus, shall we no longer care for the Danaans in their *hour of destruction*? They are filling their dread fate to the brim, slain by the fury of one man raging beyond endurance, Hector, son of Priam. Yes, he has caused much grief (emphasis added).

Like Faustus, Iliadic characters fill up (ἀναπλήσαντες) their measure of fate or time at ὑστάτιόν περ: 'this eleventh *hour*', 'this last *minute*' or 'the *hour* of destruction'.[47]

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[46]   Cf. 22.350 in Fagles' translation (=22.297).

[47]   On 8.353 as 'this eleventh hour', see W. Leaf, *The* Iliad: *Edited, with Apparatus Criticus, Prolegomena Notes, and Appendices*, (1900-1902); 'this last minute', see Kirk (n.8); 'the hour of destruction', see R. Lattimore's translation.

Consider how Hector associates fate with an allotment of time in his recognition scene when he realizes that Athene has deceived him and Deïphobus is safe inside Troy:

> νῦν δὲ δὴ ἐγγύθι μοι θάνατος κακός, οὐδ' ἔτ' ἄνευθεν,
> οὐδ'ἀλέη· ἡ γάρ ῥα πάλαι τό γε φίλτερον ἦεν
> Ζηνί τε καὶ Διὸς υἷι ἐκηβόλῳ, οἵ με πάρος γε
> πρόφρονες εἰρύατο· νῦν αὐτέ με μοῖρα κιχάνει. (22.300ff.)

But grim death without escape is nigh at hand, no longer far off. From long ago Zeus and his far-shooting son must have chosen this. And even though they willingly saved me before, now my time has come.

Although ἄνευθεν is used in a spatial sense denoting *far away*, ἐγγύθι may be understood either spatially meaning *near*, or temporally meaning *nigh at hand*.[48] The adverb νῦν suggests that ἐγγύθι should be understood in its temporal sense, and Hector therefore has come to Faustus' realization that fate is nigh at hand. And so does the narratee, who has been wondering *when* the narrator will deal out brutal fate upon Hector since the initial prolepsis in book fifteen.

Using fate as a device to further suspense presents it in an exciting and amusing light to the audience because it involves the audience, goads the audience to figure out the timeline. Poetic fate has the capacity, therefore, to entertain and add enjoyment to the tale. As Scodel notes, when the audience is amused, it is more likely to pass over implausibilites or logical contradictions in the narrative, one of which is the contradiction of freedom within fate.[49] The end result of this is an environment which is conducive to the presence of both concepts.

### ix. The harmony of fixed fate and free will

The narrator lifts the hero out of myth and invests great life into him; he *charges* him with boundless potential. The hero is fierce, godlike and glorious. He is free to defy the gods, suffer, weep, delight and rejoice. But the hero must finally pay back his *debt* to the narrator, who is after all interested in the traditional story. In a word, 'to succumb to fate' is his debt to the narrator. Like a battery, the hero is charged with the potential to be free, but his expenditure of liberty must at last be tragically ineffective, futile, contradictory. Every attempt ὑπὲρ μόρον is decisively thwarted, every attempt to break free from the narrative painfully frustrated, every try against fate brutally suppressed. In a most poignant line, Achilles curtly sums up the tragic human condition (Achilles to Apollo): ἦ σ' ἂν τισαίμην, εἴ μοι δύναμίς γε παρείη (22.20). He strives; he fails. His arm is strong, but what hand blocks the narrative deathcrush? He is free, but only free to succumb to fate. If he were stronger or freer, there would be no *Iliad*.

This merger of poetic fate and free will in the *Iliad* can be conceptualized by examining parallels from a chess endgame. The mechanics

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[48]   Although ἄνευθεν is used throughout the *Iliad* to spatially denote 'a far distance' (2.27, 2.64, 4.277, 5.185, 16.89, 21.78, 22.39, 22.88, 22.333, 22.368, 23.241, 23.378, 23.452, 23.474, 24.174, 24.208), T. Boman, *Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek*, (New York 1970) 123 argues that the Greeks 'employ space as their thought-form [for time].' Thus, the negative use of ἄνευθεν in 22.300 may refer to his hour of doom as being close in a *temporal* sense. On the ambiguity between space and time, also see Clarke (n.19) 244.

[49]   Scodel (n.3) 16.

behind the chess endgame share some intriguing similarities to the develop-
ment of weak fate and free will. Here is an endgame recorded by Chernev in
Practical Chess Endings.[50] The year is 1927. Bron has the move and plays
White to win:

Provided White plays competent moves, there are four parallels between this
endgame and the union of poetic fate and free will:

1) The endgame scenario guarantees that Black loses. However,
   Black is not defeated by the arrangement of the pieces on the
   board. Black is defeated by White's ensuing moves. Thus, the
   arrangement of the pieces on the board corresponds to a weak fate
   which does not itself act. White is the active agent which brings
   about Black's destiny.[51]

2) The endgame scenario foresees checkmate just as a prolepsis
   foresees the death of a character. Since the duration between
   endgame/checkmate or prolepsis/fulfillment is indeterminate,
   suspense is created as the audience wonders when the inevitable
   happens. Because they both sustain suspense, spatial moves
   towards closure on the board correspond to weak fate moving
   forwards temporally towards the 'last minute'.

3) The White and Black pieces—although the ending is fixed—are
   free to move in their various capacities. Their moves are not

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50   I. Chernev, *Practical Chess Endings: A Basic Guide to Endgame Strategy for the
Beginner and the More Advanced Chess Player*, (New York 1969) 309.

51   Strictly speaking, it is Achilles who is the active agent bringing about Hector's fated
death. However, the *deus ex machina* also enforces weak fate in this scenario:
Athene's deception of Hector finally permits the combat to take place. For a discussion
of her intervention bringing about necessity, see M. Willcock, *A Companion to the*
Iliad, (Chicago 1976) 22.214-77.

predetermined. However, no move will best White. Freedom on the board therefore mirrors the weak conception of free will: vivid, but futile.

4) Although Black is fated to lose, it still determines how it loses. For example, it could gutlessly forfeit the game, or it could heroically play out the game *ad extremum*—that is to checkmate. For example, when Hector realizes that his time is up, he still determines whether to die a heroic or cowardly death (22.303ff.).

Once the *Iliad* is superimposed onto the endgame, a variety of situations can be played out pictorially on the board. For example, in the endgame above Achilles and Hector can be seen playing out their final game of death around Troy's walls. Achilles plays White. It is Achilles' move, and he plays to win. The marginal notes indicating the parallel action of the *Iliad* are arbitrary. Different readers should establish their own parallels, depending upon how they interpret the *Iliad*. Here is how I imagine the endgame running out (long algebraic notation):[52]

Hector ruminating outside the Scaean gates:
> 1   Rc7-c8   Qf8-a3

If *1* . . . Qf8xc8 (or *1* . . . Qf8-f7) *2* Nf5-d6+ wins the Queen.
Achilles pursues Hector around walls:
> 2   Nf5-d4+   Kb5-b6

The only flight square, as moving to the Rook file loses by *3* Rc8-a8+.
> 3   Rc8-b8+   Kb6-c5

The alternatives *3* . . . Kb6-c7 or *3* . . . Kb6-a7 let King and Queen fall into the Knight's clutches by *4* Nd4-b5+.
> 4   Rb8-b5+   Kc5-d6
> 5   Rb5-d5+   Kd6-e7

Here too *5* . . . Kd6-c7 is met by *6* Nd4-b5+.
Athene as Deïphobos inspires Hector:
> 6   Rd5-a5!

Shifting the attack to the Queen.
> 6   . . .   Qa3xa5

It is either this, or *6* . . . Qa3-d6 when *7* Nd4-f5+ wins the Queen. Recognition scene. Hector realizes that he is duped, but will choose to end his life heroically (i.e. he does not forfeit the game).
> 7   Nd4-c6+ [53]

Goodnight sweet Hector, breaker of horses.

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